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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1960, the State of Washington has required that the salaries
of its state employees correspond to the salaries that employees
receive in the private sector.' In 1973, the state's largest public
employee union, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), concluded that allowing the free
market to set the wages of state employees perpetuated "the discrimi-
nation against women in salary settings that permeates through the
private sector and other governmental units."2 AFSCME pressured
then-Governor Evans into commissioning a private firm to study the
state's salary structure and to "examine and identify salary differences
that may pertain to job classes predominately filled by women, based
on job worth."' 3 To evaluate the worth of each job, the state estab-
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 28 B.16.100(16) (1983).
2. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington, 578
F. Supp. 846, 860 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (quoting Letter from Norm Schut, Executive Director of
Washington Federation of State Employees, to Governor Daniel J. Evans (Nov. 20, 1973)).
3. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 861. The state hired the firm of Norm Willis & Associates
to conduct the comprehensive study. The firm examined sixty-two classifications in which at
1039
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1039
lished an evaluation committee which consisted primarily of repre-
sentatives of state agencies and institutions.4
The committee found that, between female and male job classes
of "comparable worth," individuals in predominately male jobs
received approximately twenty percent more salary than individuals
in predominately female jobs.5 When the state legislature failed to
implement a plan to correct the wage disparities uncovered in the
least seventy percent of the employees were female and fifty-nine classifications in which at
least seventy percent of the employees were male. The firm calculated "job worth" or
comparable worth by evaluating jobs under four criteria: knowledge and skills, mental
demands, accountability, and work conditions. The firm then alloted a maximum number of
points to each of the catagories: 280 for knowledge and skills, 140 for mental demands, 160 for
accountability, and 20 for working conditions. The firm then assigned every job classification a
numerical value under each of the four criteria. It then added these values together to
determine a job's "worth." Those jobs with the same, or near the same, "worth" were
considered to be jobs of comparable worth. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1403
(9th Cir. 1985).
For a general discussion of comparable worth and job evaluation studies, see Schwab, Job
Evaluation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES 49 (E. Livernash ed. 1956). For a discussion of the shortcomings of job
evaluations, see Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems,
in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 59-76 (H. Remick ed. 1984).
4. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 861.
5. Id. at 863. The firm's report stated that the "conclusion can be drawn that, based on
the measured job content of the 121 classifications evaluated as part of this project, the
tendency is for women's classes to be paid less than men's classes, for comparable job worth
.... Overall... the disparity is approximately 20 percent." Id. For example, the study found
that in the predominately female job of food service worker-a job valued at 93 points by the
study-earned $472.00 a month, while the male dominated job of truck driver-valued by the
study at 94 points-earned an average $792.00 per month. A nurse practitioner, a job held
mainly by women, had a value of 385 points and received a salary of $832.00 per month, while
boiler operators, a job performed almost solely by men, had only 144 value points but paid at
the same salary as the nurse. See Remick, Major Issues in a priori Applications, in
COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 103 (H. Remick ed. 1984).
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study,6 AFSCME and the Washington Federation of State Employees
filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).7 The unions claimed that the state's salary structure was in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it
The distribution of jobs and salaries found by the study can be represented graphically as
follows:
1974 Washington State Study
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Id. at 103.
6. In 1976, Washington again hired the firm of Norman Willis & Associates to study the
state's compensation system. This time, however, the state instructed the firm to develop a
plan to correct the wage disparities between male and female employees that it had discovered
in the first study. The resulting plan called for the use of a formula to adjust upward the salary
of employees in predominately female jobs. This plan won the approval of Governor Evans,
but was rejected by his successor, Governor Dixie Ray. Note, The Comparable Worth
Dilemma: Are Apples and Oranges Ripe for Comparison?, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 227, 248 (1985).
7. Title VII can be enforced either by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or by private parties. Title VII authorizes the EEOC to investigate employment
practices, and when appropriate, file suit in the local district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)
(1982). A private party wanting to challenge discriminatory employment practices under Title
VII must first file a charge with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b). (e). If the EEOC finds to its
satisfaction that there is in fact discriminatory employment practices taking place, it
commences enforcement proceedings against the employer. If the EEOC dismisses the private
party's charge or fails to act upon it within 180 days of its filing, the private party may bring
suit against the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
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unfairly discriminated against women employees.' After the EEOC
declined to act on the charges, the United States Department of Jus-
tice issued right to sue letters to the two unions.9 The unions then
filed a class action on behalf of the women employees of the state.'0
The District Court for the Western District of Washington found
that, under both disparate impact 1 and disparate treatment' 2 analy-
sis, the state's salary structure was in violation of Title VII. 3 The
district court ordered back pay for the affected employees and injunc-
tive relief to prevent continuation of the discriminatory compensation
system.14 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held, reversed: because the unions failed to prove that
the state intended to use the market-based compensation system to
discriminate against women employees, the state salary structure did
not violate Title VII. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985), rev'g 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983)."
II. WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND COMPARABLE WORTH
Fifty percent of all men work in over sixty occupations; fifty per-
cent of all women work in only seventeen occupations.16 Twenty-five
percent of all women hold one of five jobs: secretary, domestic
8. In its complaint filed with the EEOC, AFSCME alleged that:
The State of Washington has and is discriminating on grounds of sex in
compensation against women employed in state service by establishing and
maintaining wage rates or salaries for predominately female job classifications
that are less than wage rates or salaries for predominately male job classifications
that require equal or less skill, effort and responsibility. The State maintains
these lower rates or salaries for predominately female classifications although a
study commissioned by the State itself establishes that many predominately
female jobs are discriminatorily underpaid.
Charge of Discrimination, AFSCME & AFSCME Council 28 v. Washington, Sept. 1981, cited
in Remick, supra note 5, at 104.
9. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1403.
10. AFSCME and its fellow union, the Washington Federation of State Employees
(WFSE), filed this action on behalf of some 15,500 state employees. The class was comprised
of state employees "who have worked or do work in job categories that are or have been at
least seventy percent female." Id.
11. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
13. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 864.
14. Id. at 867.71. The injunctive relief fashioned by the district court focused on
accelerating a comparable worth plan that the state legislature already enacted, but not due to
take full effect until 1993. Id. See 1983 WASH. LAWS 2071.
15. The unions and the state reached an out of court settlement on December 31, 1985.
The settlement called for the state to make annual comparable worth pay adjustments through
July 1, 1992. State law requires full comparable worth implementation by 1993. The unions
for their part agreed not to prosecute an appeal of the Ninth Circuit's decision. 24 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. No. 1145, at 13 (Jan. 6, 1986).
16. STAFF REPORT, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WOMEN AND POVERTY 7
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worker, elementary school teacher, bookkeeper, or waitress. 17 At the
same time, women earn fifty-nine cents for each dollar that a male
earns."8 The correlation between these realities is the result of a colli-
sion of social and economic forces. Studies have shown that every
society has sexually segregated jobs. Every society values female dom-
inated jobs less than jobs that males traditionally perform.' 9 One
society may make fishing a female job and weaving a male job, and
another society may reverse the job assignments. Yet, both societies
will give the male job more prestige and higher rewards.20 Our soci-
ety reflects this phenomenon through wage differentials; when women
flood a previously "male" job, the market compensation rate for the
job drops.2'
Early legislation, which was paternalistically designed to protect
the more "delicate sex," prohibited women from performing certain
jobs, thereby making those jobs "men's work. "22 The resulting sex
segregation remains although the legislation no longer exists.
Women's work has become associated with jobs that require the skills
which women traditionally have used in the home.23
Sex-based wage differentials have had a devastating economic
impact on society. Although women are primary wage-earners in
only one-tenth of all families, women head one-third of all families
below the poverty line. 24 The market based wage structure is not only
discriminatory, but also it harms society where society can least afford
(1974); see also WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS 91 (Bull. No. 297, 1975) (two-fifths of women concentrated in ten jobs).
17. Hedges, Women Workers and Manpower Demands in the 1970's, 93 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 19 (June 1970); cf L. HOWE, PINK COLLAR WORKERS, INSIDE THE WORLD OF
WOMEN'S WORK 16 (1977) (two-thirds of female labor force work in sales, service, or clerical
jobs).
18. WOMEN's BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 6 (1979) (Table 1).
19. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB
EVALUATION: AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW 52 (1979) (Interim Report to the EEOC).
20. K. MILLETr, SEXUAL POLITICS 224 (1970).
21. Bank tellers, telephone operators, school teachers, and clerks were once predominately
male jobs and are now predominately female jobs. SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 61 (1973); see also
Blumrosen, infra note 27, at 408 (bank teller was once predominately a white male job).
22. For example, women were prohibited from mining, bartending, and certain job
categories that required heavy lifting, night work, or overtime. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 149, § 53 (Michie/Law Co-op 1976) (repealed 1980) (lifting); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 405
(McKinney 1965) (repealed 1973) (mining). For a discussion of protective legislation, see
Gasaway, infra note 26, at 1127 (women barred from mining and heavy lifting).
23. J. LYLE & J. Ross, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY: EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF WOMEN IN
CORPORATE AMERICA 8 (1973).
24. Sommers, Occupational Rankings for Men and Women by Earnings, 97 MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Aug. 1974, at 34, 41, 47; Gasaway, infra note 26, at 1123.
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it: the pocketbook. Wage differentials that are based on the market
rate force women and their families into poverty. Moreover, poverty
level families cost society in welfare programs, medical programs, and
other social programs.25
In order to overcome this historical and societal pattern of wage
discrimination, proponents of pay equity have advocated the use of
comparable worth analysis. There are three branches of the compara-
ble worth theory: the judicial branch, the legislative branch, and the
administrative branch. Under the "judicial branch, '26 courts should
permit women employees to bring Title VII sex-based wage discrimi-
nation actions against employers based on a comparison of the value
25. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT,
EXPLOITATION FROM 9 TO 5 at 4 (1981). Factors other than discrimination justify about one-
third of the earnings gap between men and women. R. TSUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, ECONOMIC
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (1974); see 18 CONG. REC.
14,753 (1962). For a general discussion of sex segregation and societal factors, see Blumrosen,
infra note 27, at 402-08.
26. In addition to the judicial branch of the comparable worth theory, which focuses on
the attempt to get the federal courts to recognize that Title VII requires equal pay for
comparable work, there are also federal legislative and administrative branches, as well as a
state branch.
The federal legislative branch of comparable worth attempts to get Congress to enact
explicit legislation requiring equal pay for comparable work. For example, the House of
Representatives' Post Office and Civil Service Committee recently approved H.R. 3008, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., the Federal Equitable Pay Practices Act of 1985. The bill calls for a study of
federal wage and classification systems to see if they discriminate on the basis of sex.
The administrative branch of the theory calls for the EEOC and other federal agencies to
take procomparable worth enforcement positions. The EEOC originally opposed the use of
the comparable worth theory in pay discrimination cases, but in the late 1970's and early
1980's, it became more receptive to the concept. See The Comparable Worth Issues, Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) special report at 42 (Oct. 28, 1981). See also Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage
Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
233, 234 (1980) (In the 1970's, the EEOC chose to litigate the comparable worth issue.).
Recently, however, the EEOC has chosen to oppose the use of the comparable worth concept.
See 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 121 (June 17, 1985) (review of EEOC's current policy on sex-
based wage bias claims postponed); see also 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 147 (June 24, 1985)
(text of an EEOC decision denying a comparable worth claim). See generally Gasaway,
Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1145-46 (1981) (outline of
EEOC regulations).
The proponents of comparable worth have perhaps their greatest success on the state
level. Well over a dozen states have enacted a state-wide comparable worth standard. See
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80 220(5) (1981); IDAHO CODE § 44-1702 (1) (1977); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 337.423(1) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100,
§ 55A (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A (West 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1221(1) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West
Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-12-15
(1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202(a) (1983); W. VA. CODE § 21-5B-3(l) (1985). It should
be noted that while these state laws are important, they tend to be narrower in application than
the federal statutes. For a general discussion of state comparable worth laws, see Dean,
Roberts & Boone, Comparable Worth Under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE
WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 238-64 (H. Remick ed. 1984). For a discussion of one
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of their jobs to those of male employees who perform dissimilar work
which has the same intrinsic worth to the employer. 27 According to
this theory, society has undervalued classes of jobs that women tradi-
tionally have performed. To break this tradition of sex segregation
and undervaluation, Title VII discrimination cases must be free of the
equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), which pro-
ponents of comparable worth see as ineffective in reaching the more
fundamental forms of sex discrimination in the workplace.28
AFSCME is the latest in a long line of recent cases that have ques-
tioned the viability of comparable worth as a judicial doctrine.29
These court decisions seriously set back what proponents have called
state's experience with its own comparable worth statute, see Note, Comparable Worth - It's
Status in the Nation and Minnesota, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 559, 575-79 (1984).
On yet another level, comparable worth has come into being through private collective
bargaining. See Northrup, Wage Setting and Collective Bargaining, in COMPARABLE WORTH:
ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 107 (E. Livernash ed. 1984).
27. For the seminal discussion on the use of Title VII to advance the comparable worth
theory, see Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979) (Because job segregation has prevented both
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act from providing effective remedies for victims of wage
discrimination, courts should construe Title VII to require pay in proportion to the worth of
jobs.). For the classic criticism of the use of Title VII to advance comparable worth, see
Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 26, at 242-43,291 (construing Title VII to allow sex
discrimination claims in compensation cases to be based on a comparable worth analysis
would distort the economic principle of a free labor market).
28. See infra note 34 and accompanying text; Blumrosen, supra note 27, at 399-412;
Reiman, Comparable Worth: Will It Close the Earnings Gap or Widen the Gender Gap, 59
FLA. BAR. J. 27, 28 (1984) ("The result of systematic job segregation has been to leave women
without a remedy .... ").
29. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.) (comparable worth
not available in a Title VII disparate impact claim), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984); Plemer
v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) (questioning whether wage disparity
statistics alone could ever suffice to make a prima facie case for disparate treatment
discrimination under Title VII); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.)
(statistics showing employment disparities are insufficient to meet the burden of showing
disparate treatment under Title VII), reh'g denied, 662 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981); American
Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Title VII did not authorize the
courts to engage in wholesale reevaluation of any employer's pay structure in order to enforce
their own conceptions of economic worth.); Chang v. University of R.I., 606 F. Supp. 1161
(D.R.I. 1985) (state university did not discriminate against female physical education
instructor by paying her less than male baseball and soccer coaches); Connecticut Employees
Ass'n v. Connecticut, 31 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 191 (D. Conn. 1983) (Courts should
not engage in a subjective comparison of the intrinsic worth of various dissimilar jobs.); Power
v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982) ("There is no indication in Title
VII's legislative history that the boundaries of the Act can be expanded to encompass the
theory of comparable worth."); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
(The employer's liability under Title VII extends only to its own acts of discrimination; the
employer is not liable for market forces.); Blowers v. Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co., 27 FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1222 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (In comparable worth cases, the court must
be able to draw reasonable, nonarbitrary conclusions about the value of jobs.).
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the most important women's issue of the 1980's. 31
III. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Pay Act
The EPA, initially an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act,31 requires employers to pay equal wages to men and women "for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effect, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions. '32 Congress enacted this seemingly simple mea-
sure only after a year and a half of intense debate.33 The focus of this
debate was whether the legislation would require equal pay for equal
work or equal pay for comparable work.34
The EPA was originally part of the Kennedy Administration's
civil rights program. Both the Administration's proposal and the
committee version called for equal pay for jobs of "comparable char-
acter.' ' 35  In this regard, the Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg,
30. See, e.g., GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 1 (1983) ("Comparable
worth is the EEO issue of the decade.").
31. See Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-70, 39
U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 619-21 (1970) (discussing the origins of the EPA).
32. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1982) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(6)).
The EPA provides in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) differential based
on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a
wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply
with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
33. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Congress passed the EPA "after 18 months of careful and exhaustive study.").
34. See Comment, Equal Pay for Comparable Work, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475,
482 (1980).
35. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184-85(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)). The original proposal stated in part:
No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of
sex by paying wages to any employee at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to any employee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character on
jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such
payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit increase system which does not
discriminate on the basis of sex.
Id. (emphasis added).
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emphasized that "'[c]omparable' is a key word in our proposal. 36
Because of the Kennedy Administration's support, the committee
reported the EPA legislation with the comparable character wording
still part of the bill.37
Once on the floor of the House of Representatives, however, sev-
eral congressmen objected to the "comparable character" language.38
To narrow the scope of the measure, Representative St. George pro-
posed an amendment which changed the words "comparable charac-
ter" to "equal work."' 39  Representative St. George stated that the
word "'comparable' opens up great vistas. It gives tremendous lati-
tude to whoever is to be arbitrator in these disputes."'  Supporters of
this amendment believed that the EPA had to provide an objective
standard for sex-based wage discrimination to be effective.4" Despite
opposition from the Kennedy Administration, Congress finally passed
the EPA, as modified by the St. George amendment.
After passage of the EPA, the courts found it difficult to define
the term "equal work." The EPA itself offers no specific definition,
although it does require equal pay when jobs are of "equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions."42 These provisions, however, are left over from the Ken-
nedy Administration's "comparable character" proposal, which
included them because they are the factors that job evaluation experts
most often use to measure comparable worth.43 In the final version of
the EPA, Congress failed to clarify how these factors would impact
the "equal work" standard. In the legislative history, the Senate indi-
cated that it did not intend "equal" to mean "identical," but the
House indicated that it intended a "virtually identical" standard.44
36. 108 CONG. REC. 14, 768 (1962) (Representative Zelenko quoting the Secretary of
Labor's written response regarding whether "comparable" is the same as "equal"). The
Kennedy Administration based its "comparable character" proposal on the wartime
regulations of the National War Labor Board (NWLB). Gunther, 452 U.S. at 185, n.1
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The NWLB required equal pay for "comparable work." See In re
General Elec. Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666 (1945).
37. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 185 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. 108 CONG. REC. 14, 767-68 (1962).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Comment, supra note 34, at 482.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982). For text of the EPA, see supra note 32.
43. See Murphy, supra note 31, at 620. For a discussion on the factors used in job
evaluation studies, see Treiman, Effect of Choice of Factors Weights in Job Evaluation, in
COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 79-80 (H. Remick ed. 1984).
44. 109 CONG. REC. 8915 (1963) ("In making comparisons it has been shown that the
factors affecting job content listed below may be useful: education, skill, experience,
responsibility, quality and quantity of work, initiative, and ingenuity, physical effort, mental
effort, hazardous or objectionable labor, and working conditions."); 109 CONG. REC. 9197
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Thus, the legislative history merely adds to the confusion about Con-
gressional intent.
Until the Supreme Court, in the 1974 decision of Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan,45 ended most of the confusion by holding "equal
work" meant "substantially equal work,"4 6 lower courts often were
confused over how the EPA's comparable worth criteria related to its
"equal work" standard.47 Under this standard, any significant varia-
tion in skill, effort, or responsibility between jobs could justify a wage
disparity. After Corning Glass Works, courts could apply the EPA
only to jobs that are almost identical in nature.48 In other words, the
Corning Glass Works decision read out the last of the "comparable
character" language in the EPA and effectively barred the use of the
statute in cases where the jobs under scrutiny are only comparable in
value to the employer.
In addition to providing a standard of proof for potential plain-
tiffs, the EPA provides several statutory defenses to such suits.
Employers may maintain different wage rates for men and women in
substantially equal jobs if payment is made pursuant to a seniority
system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quality
or quantity of production, or a differential based on any factor other
than sex.4 9 An employee asserting an EPA claim, however, need not
prove that the employer intended to discriminate,50 but only that the
employer paid one sex more than the opposite sex for equal jobs.5 If
the employee can satisfy this initial burden, then the burden of proof
shifts to the employer to prove an affirmative defense or that the work
is not equal.5 2 Although the EPA protects women in "men's" jobs,
many women cannot make use of the statute because they cannot
(1963) ("Last year when the House changed the word 'comparable' to 'equal' the clear
intention was to narrow the whole concept. We went from 'comparable' to 'equal' meaning
that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, they would be very much alike or
closely related to each other.").
45. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
46. Id. at 203 n. 24.
47. See, e.g., Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973) (jobs involved
should be virtually identical); Hodgon v. Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (substantial identity of job functions); Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co.,
313 F. Supp. 257 (D.C. Wis. 1970) (The EPA does not require that jobs performed by men and
women be identical.).
48. See Brennan v. Price William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974) (discussing
the rigors of the "substantially equal" work standard), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982)
50. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
51. Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970).
52. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196-97.
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compare their jobs to jobs that men have traditionally performed. 3
B. Title VII
Less than a year after enacting the EPA, Congress opened debate
on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 Proponents originally intended
Title VIP 5 of the Civil Rights Act to provide a comprehensive guar-
antee of equal employment opportunity to members of racial and reli-
gious minorities. 6 In the closing hours of the debate on Title VII,
however, Representative Smith, an opponent of the Civil Rights Act,
offered an amendment adding sex as a Title VII protected class.5"
Supporters of the Civil Rights Act viewed this as an attempt to defeat
passage of the Civil Rights Act by adding what Representative Smith
perceived as a radical and unpopular provision.5" This legislative
manuever failed, however, when the addition of sex as a protected
class did not dissuade Congress from passing Title VII.59 Sex, there-
fore, became one of Title VII's protected classes with little congres-
sional discussion on the ramifications of such a classification.
Unlike the very narrowly written EPA, Title VII prohibits a
wide variety of discriminatory employment practices. 60 For example,
53. J. LYLE & J. Ross, supra note 22, at 104.
54. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
55. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
56. See Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments.- The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII
and Their Implications for the Issues of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 454 (1981).
57. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964). See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 185 n.1
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing similar National War Board regulations).
Because Representative Smith offered his amendment on the House floor, there was very little
time for the House to debate the merits of the change. The Supreme Court would later
comment that "[tihe legislative history of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is
notable primarily for its brevity." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976).
58. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. REV. 62, 78-79 & n.31 (1964) (Congressman Smith and nine southern
congressmen went on record in favor of the amendment, but voted against the bill.); Gold,
supra note 56, at 454-63 (Supporters of the Civil Rights Act were concerned with whether the
addition of sex would erode support for the measure.); Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 883-84 nn.34 & 35 (1967)
(Opponents of the Civil Rights Act were the strongest supporters of the addition of sex to the
list of protected classes.). But see Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage
Differential Protection Under Title VII, 8 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 723, 743-45 (1977) (disputes the
contention that inclusion of sex in Title VII was a diversionary tactic).
59. For text of Title VII, see infra note 59.
60. Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex
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section 703(a) of Title VII outlaws gender discrimination in the areas
of "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment."6
The statute also does not permit employers on the basis of sex to
"limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants. ' 62 In other
words, Title VII forbids sex-based discrimination in the hiring, com-
pensating, promoting, transferring, or firing of employees.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination in either of two
ways. First, it prohibits disparate treatment, which is the intentional
use of discriminatory employment standards.63 Second, it prohibits
disparate impact, which is the use of facially neutral employment
practices which have an unduly harsh impact upon a class protected
by Title VII. 64
The courts have used disparate treatment analysis for fifteen
years in wage discrimination cases. 65 To prove discrimination using
the disparate treatment approach, the employees initially must prove
that the employer intended to discriminate in setting the wage rates.66
One may infer discriminatory motive from the mere fact of differences
in treatment.67 The employees may offer statistical evidence support-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Title VII requires the elimina-
tion of arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment that cannot be shown to have a
significant relationship to job performance.).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1983).
62. Id.
63. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977). In this footnote, the Court explained the difference between disparate treatment and
disparate impact models of employment discrimination analysis. The Court stated that, under
the disparate treatment model, an employer violates Title VII by intentionally treating some
employees less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or origin. Id.
See generally Furnish, A Path Through the Maze. Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419
(1982).
64. International Bhd of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (stating
that discrimination can arise nonpurposefully). In Griggs, the Court stated that, because
Congress intended Title VII to reach "the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation," the employer's "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built in headwinds' for
protected classes and are related to measuring job capability." Id. at 432.
65. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
66. Texas Community Affairs v. Burdine is the seminal modern case on disparate
treatment analysis. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Under Burdine, a prima facie case established a
legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption. Id. at 254 n.7. For a discussion of the standard of
proof that employees are required to meet, see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978) (a disparate treatment case grounded on circumstantial evidence raises an inference
of discrimination because the court presumes otherwise unexplained acts "are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors").
67. International Bhd, of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The plaintiff must show that, in
the absence of any other explanation, it is more likely than not that the employer's actions
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ing an inference of the employer's discriminatory intent.68 If the
employees prove a prima facie case of discrimination, that is, actual
discrimination plus a discriminatory intent, then the burden shifts to
the employer. The employer must show "some legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reason" for the salary disparities. 69 If the employer pro-
duces evidence of legitimate business reasons, then the burden of
production shifts back to the employees to demonstrate that the legiti-
mate reasons the employer offered were not the true reasons, but were
merely a pretext for discrimination."°
Unlike disparate treatment analysis, the courts have not widely
used disparate impact analysis in wage discrimination cases.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled against the
use of disparate impact analysis in broad challenges to employment
practices, most lower courts have confined the use of this analysis to
cases that challenge a narrow, clearly defined employment practice.7
The courts have been unwilling to use disparate impact analysis in
wage discrimination cases because of the large liability which can
result without ever showing intentional discrimination.72 Disparate
were based on discriminatory considerations. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
576 (1978).
68. See Gay v. Waiters Union, Local 30, 694 F.2d 531, 553 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The best
prima facie case utilizing statistical data, one allowing the strongest inference of intentional
discrimination . . . is that in which the plaintiff's statistical proof is bolstered by other
circumstantical evidence of discrimination bringing 'the cold numbers convincingly to life.' ").
For a critical discussion of the use of statistical evidence in Title VII cases, see Campbell,
Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases.: Mimimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other
Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1984).
69. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. Under Burdine, the employer does not have
to "persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proferred reasons." Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254. The employer only has to produce evidence that there is "a genuine issue of fact as
to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Id. at 254-55.
70. Furnco Constr. Co., 438 U.S. at 577.
71. See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1978) (different group
insurance coverage for men and women employees); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740
F.2d 686, 708 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984) (use of disparate impact analysis
inappropriate in comparable worth claims).
72. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708. For differing views on the use of disparate impact analysis
in comparable worth cases, see Comment, Comparable Worth and Title VII The Case Against
Disparate Impact Analysis, 16 PAc. L.J. 833, 843-51 (1985) (disparate impact analysis should
not be permitted in comparable worth claims); Comment, Comparable Worth, Disparate
Impact and the Market Rate Salary Problem: A Legal Analysis and Statistical Application, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 730, 740-43 (1983) (disparate impact analysis may have some limited
application in comparable worth cases).
In explaining disparate impact analysis under the Civil Rights Act, the Griggs Court
stated that the "Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude [the protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
(emphasis added).
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impact claims involve proof of three elements. First, the employee
must show employment practices which are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups. Second, the employee must show the
practices in fact fall more harshly on one group than another. Third,
the employee must show the employer cannot justify the practices by
business necessity.7 3 In contradistinction to disparate treatment anal-
ysis, a disparate impact plaintiff need not prove discriminatory
motive.7 4 Instead, the courts infer the discriminatory motive from the
fact of adverse impact, thereby imposing a constructive intent stan-
dard on Title VII defendants. 75 The comparable worth cases, based
on disparate impact, center on the issue of whether a failure to pay
based on comparable worth instead of market rates is sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case under Title VII.
C. The Bennett Amendment
Because of the inauspicious beginnings of the gender provisions
of Title VII, considerable uncertainty existed in Congress over how
sex-based wage discrimination cases analyzed under Title VII's two
approaches would compare to cases analyzed under the language of
the EPA.76 Concerned with the possibility of a conflict between the
two statutes, Senator Bennett introduced an amendment to Title VII
just prior to its passage.77 The purpose of the amendment was to
make it clear to the courts that Congress did not intend Title VII to
nullify the provisions or protections of the EPA.7 The Bennett
Amendment established that a defendant may assert the four statu-
73. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 336 n.15.
74. McDonnell Douglas v. Green., 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
75. Id. at 804.
76. Senator Bennett, speaking on the Senate floor, voiced the concern of others when he
stated:
Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the fair sex in
this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of
Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became
effective only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration
of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the
word "sex" has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention
may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the
word "sex" in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964).
77. Id. For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment, see
Comment, The Bennett Amendment - Title VII and Gender Based Discrimination, 68 GEO.
L.J. 1169, 1172-77 (1979).
78. The Bennett Amendment reads:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
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tory defenses to an EPA claim as affirmative defenses to challenges
under Title VII.79
Although the Bennett Amendment clarified that Title VII did
not implicitly repeal the EPA, the amendment left unresolved the cru-
cial issue of how Title VII and the EPA should otherwise interact.
For years, the lower courts have wrestled with the question of
whether the Bennett Amendment required the use of the EPA stan-
dards in sex-based wage discrimination cases brought under Title VII.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Corning Glass Works, this con-
troversy has focused on whether the "substantially equal work" stan-
dard of the EPA is applicable to Title VII wage discrimination
cases."8 This controversy created a great deal of turmoil in the lower
courts until the Supreme Court's decision in 1981 of County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther.8'
IV. THE Gunther DECISION
In the Gunther decision, the Supreme Court partially settled the
controversy over the Bennett Amendment by holding that "inten-
tional" sex discrimination in wages is properly the subject of a Title
VII challenge without restriction by the "substantially equal work"
standard of the EPA. In this narrowly drafted opinion, the Court
recognized that Title VII represents a much more comprehensive
vehicle for attacking discrimination than the EPA and that Congress
intended the judiciary to broadly construe Title VII to prohibit the
"entire spectrum" of practices that result in gender-based employ-
ment discrimination.8 2
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
79. When introducing the amendment, Senator Bennett stated: "The purpose of my
amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act
shall not be nullified." 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964).
80. See, e.g., IUE v. Westinghouse, 631 F.2d 1094, 1100 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 967 (1985) (The Bennett Amendment did not require Title VII litigation to be bound by
the equal work standard, to do so would allow employers to discriminate against women in
ways they could not do to other Title VII protected classes.); Lemons v. City of Denver, 620
F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881 (1980) (Title VII did not cover the
wage disparities that the comparable worth theory raised.); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353,
356 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that employees had failed to prove that wage disparities grounded
on the comparable worth concept were not caused by legitimate economic reasons and thereby
avoiding any interpretation of the Bennett Amendment).
81. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
82. Id. at 180. See Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominately Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5-22
(general discussion of disparate treatment claims).
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The plaintiff in Gunther was a female guard at a county jail. The
jail in which she worked was divided into two sections: male guards
guarded male prisoners, while female guards guarded female prison-
ers. The two sets of guards performed similar duties, except that the
employer assigned female guards clerical duties that it did not give to
the male guards and the male guards supervised more prisoners.
Despite their otherwise similar duties, the female guards received sub-
stantially lower wages than the male guards.83
Gunther brought suit in district court and claimed that the
county's salary structure violated Title VII because it discriminated
against women employees. 84 Gunther alleged that she received lower
wages for work "substantially equal" to work that the male guards
performed. In the alternative, Gunther pleaded that, even if the court
did not find that the work of the female and male guards was substan-
tially equal, she still should have been able to recover under Title VII
because the wage discrepancy was the product of intentional sex dis-
crimination on the part of the county.85 She based this claim on the
county's failure to fully implement the recommendations of its own
job evaluation study which determined that the county should pay
female guards approximately ninety-five percent as much as male
guards. In spite of these recommendations, the county continued to
pay the female guards seventy percent as much as the male guards
and paid the male guards their full evaluated worth.86
The district court found that the female guards' work was not
substantially equal to that of the male guards.8" The district court
then dismissed Gunther's alternative intentional discrimination claim.
The court held that the Bennett Amendment mandated that sex-based
wage discrimination cases brought under Title VII conform to the
EPA's substantially equal work standard. 8 Because it found that the
jobs were not substantially equal, the court dismissed Gunther's Title
VII intentional sex discrimination claim.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
83. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 20 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 788, 791 (D. Or.
1976). The district court found that while the female guard performed clerical duties not
assigned to male guards, the male guards supervised more than ten times as many prisoners as
did the female guards. Id.
84. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 164. Gunther and the other female guards could not sue under
the EPA, because the EPA did not apply to municipal employees at the time Gunther brought
her suit. Id. at 164 n.3.
85. Id. at 164-65.
86. Id. at 180-81.
87. Id. at 165.
88. Gunther, 20 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) at 791.
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reversed the dismissal of the intentional sex discrimination claim.8 9
The court of appeals held that the Bennett Amendment did not pre-
vent a female employee from using Title VII to challenge a discrimi-
natory salary system merely because her job was not perfectly "equal"
to the higher-paying male job. Noting the discrepancy in the wage
structure, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a court reasonably could
find that "a portion of the discrepancy between their salaries and
those of the male guards could be ascribed only to sex
discrimination." 90
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the narrow issue
of "whether [Gunther's] failure to satisfy the equal work standard of
the Equal Pay Act in itself precludes [her] proceeding under Title
VII. '9 1 Before answering this narrow question, the Court went to
extraordinary lengths to make it clear that it was not ready to address
the broader issue of comparable worth. The Court noted that the
female guards did not seek "increased compensation on the basis of a
comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of
other jobs in the same organization or community." 92 The Court thus
emphasized that Gunther's claim was "not based on the controversial
concept of 'comparable worth.' ,,93
After stressing the limited nature of its inquiry, the Court ana-
lyzed the Bennett Amendment's impact on the EPA and Title VII.
Initially, the Court noted that the "language of the Bennett Amend-
ment suggests an intention to incorporate only the affirmative
defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII." 94 The Court found
that this construction of the Bennett Amendment ensures that courts
would adopt the same defenses to Title VII and the EPA, which is the
only way to view the Bennett Amendment without making it
superfluous. 95
The Court also reviewed the relevant legislative history of the
Bennett Amendment. Initially noting that Senator Bennett thought
89. Gunther v. County of Wash., 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
90. Gunther, 602 F.2d at 891.
91. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166 n.8. In the same footnote, the Court stated that it was not
"called upon in this case to decide whether respondents have stated a prima facie case of sex
discrimination under Title VII . . . or to lay down standards for further conduct of this
litigation." Id.
92. Id. at 166.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 168.
95. Id. at 169. The "superfluous" argument was based on the idea that Title VII actions
would be subject to the four affirmative defenses even without the Bennett Amendment.
Because Title VII was already subject to these defenses, opponents of comparable worth
argued that Congress must have wanted to incorporate more than the four defenses or it would
not have passed the provision. The Court flatly rejected this argument. Id at 169-71.
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his amendment was purely "technical" in nature and designed to
resolve possible conflicts between Title VII and the EPA,9 6 the Court
concluded its narrow reading of the provision was consistent with this
intended purpose.9" Beyond this, the Court seemingly acknowledged
that the congressional history of the Bennett Amendment failed to
make clear that the amendment's sole purpose was to incorporate the
EPA's four affirmative defenses into Title VII.
Finding the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment incon-
clusive, the Court examined the congressional debate for all of Title
VII. Because inclusion of the EPA defenses would narrow the scope
of Title VII, the Court found that a narrow reading of the Bennett
Amendment was consistent with the broad remedial purpose of Title
VII.98 The Court further emphasized the expansive wording of Title
VII and cited a congressional statement that declared a " 'broad
approach' to the definition of equal employment opportunity is essen-
tial" if the goals of Congress in enacting Title VII are to be
achieved.99 In order for Title VII to provide a remedy for all victims
of sex-based employment discrimination, as Congress intended, the
Court concluded that a narrow interpretation of the Bennett Amend-
ment was necessary.'t° The Court therefore affirmed the court of
appeals and concluded that Gunther's allegation of intent based on
failure to pay the female guards their full evaluated worth was suffi-
cient to state a prima facie case under Title VII disparate treatment
analysis. o'
In its disparate treatment analysis, the Court used the defend-
ant's own evaluation of job worth. 02 The county failed to pay its
employees in accordance with the values it assigned to their jobs;
therefore, the Court found that there was a prima facie case of inten-
tional discrimination.0 3 The Court noted that it did not have to
make its own assessment of the value of the jobs "or to attempt by
statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect of sex dis-
crimination on the wage rates."'0 4 This was the crucial factor the
Court used to distinguish Gunther's facts from a comparable worth
96. Id. at 171-76.
97. Id. at 174-75.
98. Id. at 178.
99. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964)). The Court stated "[w]e
must therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a
remedy, without clear congressional mandate." Gunther, 452 U.S. at 178.
100. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 178-80.
101. Id. at 180-81.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 181.
104. Id.
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case. The Court relied heavily upon the plaintiff's allegations of
intent based on "setting the wage scale for female guards, but not for
male guards, at a level lower than its own survey of outside markets
and the worth of the jobs warranted."' 5
Justice Rehnquist filed a biting dissenting opinion in which three
other Justices concurred. 0 6 Justice Rehnquist stated: "the flaw with
today's decision is not so much that it is so narrowly written as to be
virtually meaningless, but rather that its legal analysis is wrong." 107
Justice Rehnquist complained that the Court's holding was so limited
that it would give almost no guidance to the lower courts in deciding
what types of compensation systems would violate Title VII.'08
The bulk of Justice Rehnquist's dissent was an examination of
the congressional history of the EPA and Title VII. Justice Rehn-
quist concluded:
In adopting the "equal pay for equal work" formula, Congress
carefully considered and ultimately rejected the "equal pay for
comparable worth" standard .... As the legislative history of the
Equal Pay Act amply demonstrates, Congress realized that the
adoption of the comparable-worth doctrine would ignore the eco-
nomic realities of supply and demand and would involve both gov-
ernmental agencies and courts in the impossible task of
ascertaining the worth of comparable work, an area in which they
have little expertise.' 0 9
Not surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist found the congressional history of
Title VII dealing with the comparable worth question very brief."0
Because Congress was nearly silent on the issue, Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that Congress retained its concern over the dangers of com-
parable worth. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Bennett Amend-
ment, by implication, should prohibit development of a comparable
worth doctrine under Title VII."I'
Although pay equity proponents hailed the Gunther decision as a
partial victory, they have made little advancement toward recognition
of a pure comparable worth cause of action since this landmark deci-
sion in 1981.'12 By so closely tailoring its opinion and relying upon
the employer's failure to pay employees according to its own evalua-
105. Id. at 166.
106. Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and
Powell joined Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Id.
107. Id. at 183-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 183 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 184 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 188-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 192 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. Reiman, supra note 26, at 29.
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tions of the employee's worth, the Gunther Court refrained from
directly reviewing the merits of a case in the context of the theory of
comparable worth. t13 In strictly limiting its holding, the Gunther
Court left unresolved a number of key issues, including: the nature of
the proof required to prove intent in a Title VII sex-based wage dis-
crimination claim under disparate treatment theory, the role of mar-
ket conditions in a Title VII case, and the very existence of a Title VII
comparable worth cause of action. 4
V. THE AFTERMATH OF Gunther
A. Comparable Worth Is Wounded
So far, the lower courts have been unwilling to accept the compa-
rable worth theory as a judicial doctrine.' For example, in the early
post-Gunther case of Blowers v. Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., 6
the District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed a
comparable worth claim by female employees which challenged a job
classification system which placed predominately female jobs at the
bottom of the pay scale. The district court dismissed the claim
because the employees failed to provide "any quantitatively-oriented
expert testimony or evidence from which ... to draw a reasonable
nonarbitrary conclusion""' 7 about the "worth" of the job under
scrutiny.
Similarly, in Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane,1 8 the Fifth Circuit dis-
missed a comparable worth claim because it "asks too much";" 9 it
would compel the court to make an "essentially subjective assessment
of the value"' 2 ° of two jobs and to determine whether the women
employees received less than the social value of their positions merely
because they are female. The Plemer court interpreted Gunther as
concerning only "blatant cases of sex discrimination in which the only
113. For scholarly comment on Gunther and its impact, see Note, Proving Title VII Sex-
Based Wage Discrimination After County of Washington v. Gunther, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 281
(1983); Note, Women, Wages and Title VII: The Significance of County of Washington v.
Gunther, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 467 (1982); Note, County of Washington v. Gunther: Sex-
Based Wage Discrimination Extends Beyond the Equal Pay Act, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 151
(1983); Comment, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims After County of Washington v.
Gunther, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1333 (1981).
114. See Williams & Bagby, The Legal Framework, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES 232-33 (R. Livernash ed. 1983).
115. For a listing of some recent comparable worth cases, see supra note 29.
116. 27 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1222 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
117. Id. at 1223.
118. 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983).
119. Id. at 1134.
120. Id.
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stumbling block to underpaid females' causes of action [sic] was the
fact that the victimized women did not hold similar jobs to those held
by men. "121 The comparable worth claim, the Plemer court stated,
demonstrated "no transparently sex-biased system of wage determina-
tion"'122 by the employer and thus was not covered by the Gunther
decision. The court concluded that absent direct statistical evidence
as to how the employer valued jobs, it was "not the province of the
courts to value the relative worth of ... [employees with] differing
duties and responsibilities."' 123
In Briggs v. City of Madison, 24 female city nurses claimed that
the employer set their salaries intentionally lower than those of com-
parable male health professionals. A job evaluation expert, testifying
on behalf of the nurses, offered statistical evidence that the two posi-
tions were comparable in value to the city. 125 The city did not refute
this expert testimony. Instead, the city raised the defense that market
forces necessitated the wage differential between men and women. 126
The district court accepted this defense and held that, under "Title
VII, an employer's liability extends only to its own acts of discrimina-
tion."' 27 The court concluded that "[n]othing in the Act indicates
that the employer's liability extends to conditions of the marketplace
which it did not create."' 128 In accepting the so-called marketplace
defense, the court rejected the view that such a defense only perpetu-
ates the historically ingrained wage discrimination against women. 129
After Gunther and the lower federal court cases interpreting it,
plaintiff employees must make two showings to succeed under compa-
rable worth analysis. First, the employee must prove that the
employer knew the jobs were of equal value. Second, the employee
must prove that the employer intentionally paid its female employees
at a lower rate. 130 Because courts will not make their own assessment
of the value of different duties, they insist that the employer already
have evaluated the job's worth.' 3 1
Although courts are particularly reluctant to compare com-
121. Id. at 1133.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1134.
124. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
125. Id. at 440-41.
126. Id. at 446.
127. Id. at 447.
128. Id.
129. Id. See Reiman, supra note 28, at 30.
130. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 180-81.
131. Id. at 181.
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pletely dissimilar jobs, they will compare somewhat dissimilar jobs.132
Yet, even if a plaintiff makes a prima facie case for intentional dis-
crimination, the employer may show a valid reason for the pay dispar-
ity under the EPA defenses. 33 The plaintiff must then show that the
asserted reasons were a pretext for paying discriminatory wages. 134
Thus, if a plaintiff can get past a motion for summary judgment on
the prima facie case, intentional discrimination claims based on com-
parable worth will take the same form as any other Title VII claim. 13
B. Spaulding: A Mortal Blow
Two years after Briggs, in an apparent rejection of the compara-
ble worth theory as a cause of action under Title VII, the Ninth Cir-
cuit refused to accept the proposition that wage disparities between
jobs held predominately by men and those held predominately by
women constitute evidence of sex discrimination. In the 1984 case of
Spaulding v. University of Washington,136 the court stated that to
accept the comparable worth theory "would plunge us into uncharted
and treacherous areas."'3 7
In Spaulding, the predominately female faculty of the University
of Washington School of Nursing, using comparable worth analysis,
alleged sex-based wage discrimination between themselves and the
predominately male faculties of the other schools of the university.
To support its claim, the nursing faculty cited a study by the adminis-
tration of the university which indicated that the salaries of the nurs-
ing faculty were considerably less than those of comparable other
faculties. 131 Yet, the nursing faculty could not produce any evidence
which demonstrated that the wage disparities were the result of an
132. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
511 (1984) ("Gunther allows a 'comparison of somewhat dissimilar jobs.' ").
133. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
134. EEOC v. Affiliated Foods, 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 943, 959 (W.D. Mo.
1984). Cf. Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (employer may
show business justification where different skills are required for the performance of jobs). For
a discussion of the EPA defenses, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
135. See American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Cox v.
American Case Iron Pipe Co., 585 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ala. 1984). Not all courts recognize
comparable worth-like claims under a disparate treatment theory, even where intent is fairly
clear. The courts that reject such claims ignore the intentional aspect of the claims and label
them as pure comparable worth claims. Some plaintiffs denied that they were basing their
claims on comparable worth, contending that they were seeking relief under a more traditional
theory. See, e.g., Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) (classic claim of
unequal pay for equal work).
136. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
137. Id. at 706.
138. Id. at 692.
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intentional effort on the part of the university to discriminate against
its women employees.
In examining the nursing faculty's Title VII claim, the Ninth
Circuit first used disparate treatment analysis. 3 9 Because there was
no direct proof of a discriminatory motive, the court scrutinized the
statistical evidence to determine if it supported an inference that the
wage differentials were the result of intentional sex discrimination.
The fact that pay rates are different, the court stated, was "insufficient
alone to establish"' 40 the necessary element of intent. To infer intent,
the court held, the plaintiffs would have to couple the statistical evi-
dence with either some direct evidence of intentional discrimination
or some showing of bad faith by the employer when confronted with
reports of sex-based wage disparities. Because the nursing faculty
only offered statistical evidence of intent, the Ninth Circuit found that
the comparable worth claim failed to prove a Title VII cause of action
under disparate treatment analysis.1 4 1 As the statistics were inaccu-
rate, the Ninth Circuit rejected the nurses' use of statistics in Spauld-
ing.142  The court stated that the plaintiffs could use properly
authenticated statistics to prove intent, but it warned of statistics'
"inherently slippery nature."' 4  The court was particularly con-
cerned with the use of comparative, as opposed to general, statistics.
Because the statistics were inaccurate and misleading, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected their use to prove a prima facie case of disparate
treatment. 44
The Spaulding court then examined the nursing faculty's claim
under Title VII's disparate impact analysis. "41 The nursing faculty
alleged that the university's facially neutral practice of paying market-
based salaries had an adverse impact on female employees.' 46 The
court refused to reach the merits of the nursing faculty's claim
because the court questioned whether "the disparate impact model is
available to plaintiffs who ... make a broad-ranging sex-based claim
of wage discrimination, based on comparable worth." 41 Judicial
management was the court's major concern in Spaulding. The court
cited lack of precedent, vagueness, and administrative difficulties as
139. Id. at 700.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 703-04.
142. Id. at 704.
143. Id. at 703 (citing Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 395 (5th Cir.)).
144. Id. at 704.
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reasons to reject the comparable worth theory. After reviewing prior
cases, 41 the court found that most lower federal courts had ruled
against the use of disparate impact analysis in broad-based wage dis-
crimination cases. The Ninth Circuit stated that it was unwilling to
go against this tide of decisions in comparable worth cases, because
"evidence of a pay disparity between jobs that are only comparable
says very little about discrimination. "149
Moreover, the court noted that even if it were to allow the nurs-
ing faculty to use disparate impact analysis, the university's policy of
paying the prevailing market rate was not a facially neutral practice
subject to Title VII attack. 5 ° In defining "facially neutral practice"
in its disparate impact analysis, the court found that "practices"
involve conscious policy-making: intelligence test requirements,' 5 '
height and weight requirements, 52 pregnancy leave policies,'53 poli-
cies which exclude applicants based on arrest records,5 4 or fringe
benefits policies. 5 By contrast, the court found that employers are
generally "price-takers," those who accept a market price, who could
not have a meaningful market "policy" because they lack an opportu-
nity to control the market in which they operate. 56 Every employer,
the court stated, has to look to the marketplace to set wages. To
148. Id. at 705-08.
149. Id. at 704. The Spaulding court cited the following cases: Power v. Barry County, 539
F. Supp. 721, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (recognition of intentional discrimination may signal the
other limit of legal theories cognizable under Title VII), cited with approval in Spaulding, 740
F.2d at 706; Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982) (the appropriate
vehicle from which to launch a wide ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a company's
employment practices is disparate treatment analysis), cited with approval in Spaulding, 740
F.2d at 707. See also Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under The Title VII Disparate
Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982) (surveying cases and presenting arguments
why courts should not use disparate impact analysis in comparable worth cases) cited with
approval in Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 706.
150. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 709.
151. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (intelligence testing).
152. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements).
153. Eg., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980)
(pregnancy leave policies).
154. E.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrest records).
155. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (fringe benefits).
156. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708. The court concluded:
Relying on competitive market prices does not qualify as a facially neutral
policy or practice for the purposes of the disparate impact analysis ....
Every employer constrained by market forces must consider market values
in setting his labor costs. Naturally, market prices are inherently job-related,
although the market may embody social judgments as to the worth of some jobs.
Employers relying on the market are, to that extent, "price-takers." They deal
with the market as a given, and do not meaningfully have a "policy" about it in
the relevant Title VII sense . . . . Additionally, allowing plaintiffs to establish
reliance on the market as a facially neutral policy for Title VII purposes would
1062
THE DEATH OF COMPARABLE WORTH
impose liability solely on the basis of this practice, the court con-
cluded, would punish the employer for economic forces outside its
control. 157
One might question at this point the validity of the argument
that a price-taker does not make a conscious policy decision. Propo-
nents of comparable worth argue that the employer makes a policy
decision when he pays an employee according to the prevailing mar-
ket prices rather than a statistical evaluation of the job's value to the
employer.
Spaulding was a crushing defeat for advocates of the comparable
worth theory. Not only did the Ninth Circuit explicitly rule against
the use of the disparate impact analysis in comparable worth claims,
but also the court heightened the employees' burden of proof under
disparate treatment analysis. After Spaulding, employees not only
have to provide statistical evidence of a wage disparity to prove inten-
tional discrimination, but they also must show employer bad faith or
produce direct evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate. The
result of this heightened standard of proof is that employees will be
able to prove a comparable worth claim only in the most blatant
instances of sex discrimination.
VI. AFSCME
A. The District Court Opinion
The District Court for the Western District of Washington ren-
dered its decision in AFSCME158 more than a year before the Ninth
Circuit's condemnation of comparable worth in Spaulding. 9 Yet,
even if the district court had decided AFSCME after Spaulding, it still
could have found in favor of the female employees because the court
did not characterize AFSCME as a classic comparable worth case. 160
Because the state already had commissioned the private study in
1974,161 the court did not have to do its own evaluation of the intrin-
sic value of public sector jobs. In an attempt to more closely parallel
subject employers to liability for pay disparities with respect to which they have
not, in any meaningful sense, made an independent business judgment.
Id.
157. Id.
158. AFSCME v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846, 860 (W.D. Wash. 1983). Despite the
district court's contention that AFSCME did not present a comparable worth case, most
commentators in the area consider it to be the classic comparable worth decision because the
court compared dissimilar jobs. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 28, at 31.
159. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 706.
160. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 865.
161. Id. at 866.
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the Gunther case and thus avoid the post-Gunther precedents which
challenged the validity of the comparable worth concept, the district
court apparently refused to recognize that AFSCME's complaint
presented a comparable worth claim.
Instead of a comparable worth case, the district court viewed
AFSCME's claim as presenting a case of "failure to pay" '6 2 admit-
tedly earned wages. From this unique perspective, the court stated
that the case involved the question of whether "the Defendant's fail-
ure to pay the Plaintiffs their evaluated worth, under the provisions of
the Defendant's comparable worth studies, constitutes discrimination
in violation of provisions of Title VII."' 63 Before answering this ques-
tion, the court noted that "there has been historical discrimination
against women in employment in the State of Washington, and that
discrimination has been and is manifested by direct, overt and institu-
tionalized discrimination."' 64 Because it found that "there is no cred-
ible evidence in the record that would support a finding that the
State's practices and procedures were based on any factor other than
sex,"' 65 the district court held that AFSCME had established a prima
facie case of sex-based wage discrimination under both the disparate
treatment and disparate impact approaches of Title VII.' 66
The court found evidence of disparate treatment in the state's
failure to pay its women employees the salaries which its own job
surveys mandated. The court held that the plaintiffs established dis-
criminatory intent by showing:
(a) the deliberate perpetuation of an approximate 20% disparity in
salaries between predominately male and predominately female job
classifications with the same number of job evaluation points; (b)
other statistical evidence including the inverse correlation between
the percentage of women in a classification and the salary for the
classification; (c) application of subjective standards which have a
disparate impact on predominately female jobs; (d) admissions by
present and former state officials that wages paid to employees in
predominately female jobs are discriminatory; and (e) the Defend-
ant's failure to pay the Plaintiffs their evaluated worth as estab-
lished by the Defendant.167
The court also noted, as further proof of sex discrimination, the
state's use of newspaper "help wanted" ads in separate male and
162. Id. at 865.
163. Id. at 866 (footnote omitted).
164. Id. at 864.
165. Id. at 866.
166. Id. at 864.
167. Id.
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female columns. 6 ' Consequently, the court inferred the state's dis-
criminatory intent from these examples of the state's disparate treat-
ment of its employees. Because the state did not rebut AFSCME's
prima facie case at trial, AFSCME did not have to show that the
state's explanation for the wage disparities was a mere pretext for
discrimination. 169
The district court also held the state's salary system had a dispa-
rate impact on employees in predominately female job classifications
because of the documented wage disparities between female and male
jobs of comparable value. The court found that the state's salary
structure could constitute a facially neutral practice and concluded
that the job evaluation studies, which showed a twenty percent differ-
ence between comparably valued male and female jobs, established a
prima facie case of disparate impact.' The district court's analysis
was as follows: the state intentionally implemented its system of com-
pensation; the market reflects a historical pattern of wage discrimina-
tion against women; to base wages on the market is to perpetuate the
historical pattern of discrimination; therefore, the state intentionally
discriminated against women through its wage structure.
AFSCME was the first, and so far the only, case in which advo-
cates of pay equity have been able to convince a court to accept the
doctrine of comparable worth although the court characterized the
issue as "failure to pay." For more than a year, AFSCME stood as a
bold precedent which comparable worth proponents were able to cite
as the paradigm for future Title VII actions. 7 ' Then came the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Spaulding, which suddenly transformed
AFSCME into a decision subject to reversal. 72
B. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had to decide between the district
court's embrace of comparable worth and its own nearly complete
168. Id. at 860.
169. Id. at 863.
170. Id. at 864.
171. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 28, at 31.
172. The Ninth Circuit was almost certain to at least partially overturn the district court,
because the district court based its use of disparate impact analysis on Wambheim v. J.C.
Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cited with approval in AFSCME, 578
F. Supp. at 856. The Wambheim opinion involved a class-action attacking the employer's
"head-of-household" rule which limited medical and dental insurance coverage. The
Wambheim court found that the employees had successfully established a prima facie case
under the disparate impact approach. Id. at 1494. The Spaulding court later limited the
holding in Wambheim by stating it "specifically dealt with a particular employer policy rather
than a full-scale assault on the employer's salary practices." Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708.
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rejection of the theory in Spaulding. The court of appeals refused to
retreat from its decision in Spaulding. Instead, the court used
AFSCME as an opportunity to further limit the possible use of the
comparable worth concept in Title VII cases. 173 Initially, the court
limited the impact of comparable worth analysis by striking down the
district court's use of disparate impact analysis to prove the state's
compensation system was discriminatory.1 74 Citing Spaulding, the
AFSCME court held that "the decision to base compensation on the
competitive market, rather than on a theory of comparable worth,
involves the assessment of a number of complex factors not easily
ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be appropriate for
disparate impact analysis."' 75 The court emphasized that a compen-
sation system that is the result of complex market forces is not "a
single practice that suffices to support a claim under disparate impact
theory." 176
After finding disparate impact analysis inappropriate for compa-
rable worth claims, the AFSCME court reviewed the district court's
use of disparate treatment analysis. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
district court's analysis of intent for purposes of disparate treatment,
attacking that court's analysis on two fronts. First, the court found
that intent is logically linked to culpability. This notion of wrongdo-
ing, the court stated, would be undermined if the "payment of wages
according to prevailing rates in the public and private sectors is an act
which, in itself, supports the inference of a purpose to discrimi-
nate."' 177 Refusing to find "the free market system a suspect enter-
prise," 178 the court found that the "economic reality" was "that the
value of a particular job to an employer is but one factor influencing
the rate of compensation for that job."' 179 As examples of other con-
siderations that may influence the salary an employer is willing to
pay, the court cited "the availability of workers willing to do the job
and the effectiveness of collective bargaining in a particular indus-
try."' 80 This expansion of the market-rate defense casts doubt on
whether any claim brought under the comparable worth theory can
ever be successful because the employer can always assert that some
market force caused the pay differential. Furthermore, the language of
173. AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
174. Id. at 1403-06.
175. Id. at 1406 (citing Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 708).
176. Id.
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Title VII and its legislative history indicate no congressional intent to
"abrogate fundamental economic principles such as the laws of supply
and demand or to prevent employers from competing in the labor
market." 181
The court's second justification for not applying comparable
worth analysis was that AFSCME's statistics were insufficient to
establish the inference of discriminatory intent absent corroborative
evidence. Attacking the district court's reliance on the private firm's
study, the Ninth Circuit stated that "job evaluation studies and com-
parable worth statistics alone are insufficient to establish the requisite
inference of discriminatory motive critical to the disparate treatment
theory."' 82 The court held that the use of discriminatory newspaper
advertisments failed to provide enough nonstatistical evidence to sup-
port a finding of intentional wage discrimination."8 3
In light of Spaulding, the court's decision in AFSCME is far from
surprising. Pay equity advocates ostensibly lost, at least in the Ninth
Circuit, the Title VII comparable worth battle in Spaulding. The
AFSCME decision, however, is still significant in two important
respects. First, the decision reversed the only major decision recog-
nizing a comparable worth claim under Title VII and thereby left pay
equity advocates without any precedent on which to base future com-
parable worth actions. Second, it stated with unmistakable clarity the
almost insurmountable burden of proof any future comparable worth
claimant will have to carry. After AFSCME, comparable worth
claimants not only will have to produce statistical evidence, but also
direct evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate against classes
of employees in setting salaries. Moreover, even if future plaintiff
employees are able to meet this heavy burden of production, they also
will have to be able to refute any "marketplace defenses" that the
employer is certain to raise.
VII. AFSCME's SHORTCOMINGS
Although the Supreme Court's refusal in Corning Glass Works to
require equal pay for comparable work was justified in light of the
EPA's legislative history,184 the AFSCME court's same narrow inter-
181. Id. One commentator noted that, by making this argument, courts implicitly
recognize the pervasive nature of discrimination manifested in the market rate: it is not that
courts believe there is no discrimination, but that there is too much discrimination to grant
relief. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination and Job Segregation: The Survival of a Theory, 14
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 5 (1980).
182. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407.
183. Id. at 1407-08.
184. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
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pretation of Title VII is plainly inconsistent with Congress's intent in
enacting Title VII to provide a remedy for all forms of discrimination
in the workplace. 185 Moreover, because of Gunther's narrow con-
struction of the Bennett Amendment, Title VII's broad prohibition
against discriminatory compensation practices clearly includes other
types of discrimination than unequal pay for equal work. Because the
language of Title VII is directed expressly toward wage discrimina-
tion, and not just discriminatory hiring practices, courts should con-
strue the statute broadly to reach all forms of wage discrimination.
Thus, this broad prohibition and the far-reaching remedial purpose of
Title VII should enable female workers to use the concept of compa-
rable worth to challenge sex-based wage discrimination.
In enacting Title VII, Congress sought to guarantee equal
employment opportunities to members of groups that traditionally
have been the victims of discrimination. To provide this guarantee,
Congress drafted Title VII to reach "all aspects of discrimination in
employment."'8 6 In 1972, while studying amendments to other provi-
sions of Title VII, Congress discovered, to its disappointment, that "a
profound economic discrimination against women workers" still
existed in salary settings. 18 7 Because Title VII was supposed to have
remedied this type of discrimination, Congress found this situation
"particularly objectionable."'' 81 Congress then reiterated its view that
"discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of
prohibited employment practices." 189 These statements, coupled with
the broad sweep of Title VII, indicate that Congress already has
endorsed the concept of comparable worth.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals in AFSCME effectively barred
the use of Title VII to prohibit unequal pay for work of comparable
worth. The court employed two mechanisms to frustrate congres-
sional intent. First, it substantially heightened the burden of proof
required of women employees in comparable worth cases. 9 ° By
requiring women employees to come forward with both statistical
proof and substantial direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the
AFSCME court drew a sharp and ill-founded distinction between sex
and other Title VII protected classes.' 9' Courts long have recognized
185. See supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
186. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
187. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1972). See Note, Equal Pay, Comparable
Work, and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657, 670 (1981).
188. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1972).
189. Id. at 5.
190. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1405.
191. Id. at 1405-07. In determining the burden of proof standard, the court relied most
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comparable worth-like claims by members of other Title VII pro-
tected classes without requiring both substantial direct evidence of
discriminatory intent and statistical data of discriminatory impact. 192
The Ninth Circuit's decision to require this heightened standard of
proof for women plaintiffs in comparable worth claims not only runs
counter to prior case law, but also contradicts Congress's desire that
the courts treat all Title VII protected classes equally.' 93
Second, the court of appeals defeated Congress's intent by
expanding the market-rate defense to a comparable worth claim. The
Ninth Circuit found nothing in Title VII to indicate Congress
intended to authorize judicial interference with "economic reality"
and "the laws of supply and demand."' 94 Thus, Title VII did not
prohibit unequal pay for comparable work where market forces set
the wage rate. In addition, the court of appeals found that disparate
impact analysis did not apply to employment decisions and practices
solely based on market factors or economic considerations.' 95 This
argument is, of course, wrong. The purpose of Congress in enacting
Title VII was to guarantee equitable, not efficient, employment prac-
tices. Judicial intervention in the free market to end discriminatory
employment practices is exactly why Congress passed Title VII.
Moreover, Congress recognized that, although market intervention
may cause short-term inefficiency, the long-term removal of discrimi-
natory employment practices by opening up the labor market to more
workers would promote a freer and more efficient marketplace.' 96
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's recognition of a "market-rate defense" not
only defeats congressional intent, but also economic efficiency.
The court of appeals did not need to examine the more esoteric
aspects of Title VII analysis relating to comparable worth. Using dis-
parate treatment analysis, the court could have decided more nar-
rowly in favor of AFSCME. Although the district court's analysis of
intent was correct in light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Gunther,
in several crucial aspects AFSCME is no more a comparable worth
case than Gunther. That the state evaluated the worth of its employ-
ees, yet failed to pay the female employees according to the evalua-
heavily on two other sex discrimination cases. See Personal Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979); Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 511 (1984).
192. See, e.g., Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (E.D. Va. 1968)
(unequal wage for comparable work because of racial reasons violates Title VII).
193. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
194. AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407.
195. Id.
196. See Note, supra note 187, at 672-73.
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tions, is sufficient to state a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
One has difficulty imagining a more blatant instance of intentional
wage discrimination than that in AFSCME. In AFSCME, the State of
Washington actually formed a committee to determine the inherent
value to the state of various public sector jobs. Having found that
particular dissimilar jobs were of equal value, the state then commis-
sioned a study to find out whether these jobs of admittedly equal val-
ues received the same salaries or wages. When the study revealed that
predominately female jobs garnered significantly less remuneration
than predominately male jobs of equal value, the state chose to ignore
the study. Even though the state's own study had determined that
various jobs had the same inherent value, the state refused to pay
them equally. Although the district court used this discrepancy in
finding intent, the court of appeals did not even consider these facts in
its analysis. The court of appeals could have equated AFSCME with
the facts in Gunther and used the Supreme Court's analysis in Gun-
ther to find in favor of plaintiffs on the narrow issue of disparate treat-
ment. It need not have made the decision a frontal attack on the
comparable worth theory.
VIII. BEYOND AFSCME
After AFSCME, because the Ninth Circuit found that Title VII
analysis precluded disparate impact theory for comparable worth
cases altogether, the only way an employee may assert a Title VII
comparable worth claim is to prove disparate treatment. AFSCME,
through incorrect analysis,' 97 has made it virtually impossible to
prove discriminatory intent in a comparable worth case. Where an
employer evaluates job classifications as equal in value, realizes the
sexual wage disparities, yet continues to use the same compensation
system, the plaintiff should be able to show a prima facie case of dis-
parate treatment. Although the Gunther Court's analysis probably
would allow employees to state a prima facie case under disparate
treatment analysis where the employer evaluates the classifications
himself or enacts only partially the recommendations of a study,
AFSCME would not allow this.
A. Voluntary Job Segregation
Do women choose their professions freely and have the option to
choose between lower and higher-paying jobs? Courts, including the
Ninth Circuit, apparently think so, because if the employer causes the
197. See supra Section VII.
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job segregation, the employer clearly would be guilty of intentional
discrimination. There are several problems with this assumption.
First, women predominate in entry-level positions because of the
recent rise in their labor force participation. 9 ' Because the job mar-
ket is difficult to enter, many women must start in traditionally female
jobs. Second, once in a traditionally female job, women have little
upward mobility. Third, people in sexually segregated classifications
tend to remain in those classifications. Even if employers hire women
in managerial positions, women already employed as clericals will
remain clericals.' 99 Women in low-paying job classifications do not
necessarily remain there by choice. The lack of on-the-job training,
increasing skills, promotional opportunities, and respect keep women
in the same classifications. 2°
B. The Free Market Excuse
Employers claim that supply and demand, rather than bias, influ-
ence the job market. Although courts have accepted this defense, one
also may conclude that if the free market is inherently discriminatory,
then an employer's choice of free market prices must necessarily be a
consciously discriminatory practice. Yet, even courts that have rec-
ognized discrimination as an influence on the free market have taken
the stance that it is not the employer's fault that the free market dis-
criminates. 2 1 This is a circular argument. First, comparable worth
statistics clearly show that the free market is discriminatory as
applied to women.2 °2 Second, employers as participants in the free
market help set the market rates. Therefore, because the purpose
behind Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in the work force,
courts should hold employers responsible for discriminatory actions,
including their decision to do nothing to change the free market's
inherent discrimination. In AFSCME, for example, the employer his-
torically segregated job classifications by separate advertising for men
and women in classified ads. Because Washington did nothing to
integrate already segregated job classifications,2 °3 the policy behind
Title VII dictates that the Ninth Circuit should have found the state
198. Blumrosen, supra note 27, at 412-13.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1407.
202. Release of New Study on Comparable Worth, LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 320
(1981). See J. LYLE & J. Ross, supra note 23, at 104-05; Blumrosen, supra note 27, at 410-14;
Gasaway, supra note 26, at 1126. Contra Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and
the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231 (1980).
203. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 861, 862.
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liable under disparate treatment analysis.20 4
C. Value and the Market Rate
The Ninth Circuit necessarily believes that the market is the true
measure of a job's value; if an employer pays other than the true value
of a job, then he is guilty of intentional discrimination. In the cases
where employers evaluated various job classifications, the jobs with
the same value to the employer were not necessarily paid the same.20 5
Employers paid holders of predominately female jobs much less than
holders of predominately male jobs. The market rates, then, do not
always reflect the true value of a particular job to an employer.
In a case like AFSCME, where the employer knowingly and
intentionally paid women less than men,20 6 Title VII should provide a
remedy. Even when an employer knows, or should know, that in a
particular situation the market rates or market classifications are dis-
criminatory, the conscious and deliberate act of adopting the market
rates or classifications should be violative of Title VII under disparate
treatment.
D. The Open Wound
Will job segregation heal itself? Comparable worth opponents
assume it will be based on the above assumptions: if women segregate
themselves voluntarily, and if the free market is neutral, then the solu-
tion to the problem is simply voluntary integration, not comparable
worth. Even as some men and women move into traditionally sexu-
ally segregated jobs, some will remain in the same jobs. Furthermore,
as employers hire more women in traditionally male jobs, history indi-
cates the market will begin to devalue these jobs.2 °7 If left alone, the
market may ascribe the same value to the lawyer of tomorrow as it
does to the telephone operator of today.
One could argue that, in light of Title VII's broad purposes, Con-
gress authorized any action necessary to eliminate discrimination in
the work force. Comparable worth opponents, however, argue that
Congress did not intend to interfere with the free market system.
This argument ignores the legislative history of Title VII. Because
204. See supra notes 65-70, 102-04 and accompanying text.
205. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); International Union of Elec.,
Radio, & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
206. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 863.
207. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Congress intended Title VII to have a broad scope, it is possible that
comparable worth already may be within Title VII's intended scope.
E. The Best Case or the Last Opportunity: The Philadelphia Story
Shortly after the Washington case settled out of court, AFSCME
filed a much stronger case against the city of Philadelphia. 20 8
AFSCME has alleged a pattern and practice of discrimination based
on several employment practices: "[p]aying female employees less
than male employees performing substantially equivalent job duties;
[i]ntentionally engaging in a pattern and practice of paying employees
in traditionally female jobs less than employees in traditionally male
jobs which require an equivalent or lesser composite of skill, effort,
responsibility and working conditions on the basis of sex; and
[d]iscriminating in compensation by providing for disparate terms
and conditions for promotion and advancement for traditionally male
and traditionally female job classifications. ' 209 These disparate terms
and conditions include imposing tests and other requirements for pro-
motion to traditionally female jobs that are not required for promo-
tion to traditionally male jobs, denying job training for employees in
traditionally female jobs, and establishing career ladders for tradition-
ally female jobs that are shorter than career ladders for traditionally
male jobs.210
AFSCME appears to have learned several lessons from the
Washington case about alleging intentional discrimination. The Phil-
adelphia allegations are much stronger because they address specific
incidents of intentional discrimination. 21 ' AFSCME also has alleged
practices that more strongly support a disparate impact claim.2 12
Should AFSCME win the Philadelphia case, it will be not only a vic-
tory for comparable worth proponents, but also for Title VII analysis
in general.
IX. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of comparable worth represents an attempt to pro-
duce equality in wages between men and women. Title VII and the
EPA provide a two-prong attack against sex-based salary discrimina-
tion.2 13 Since the 1970's, the courts, almost without exception, have
208. District Council 33 v. City of Philadelphia, No. 85-7418 (E.D. Pa. filed Dec. 26, 1985)





213. See supra notes 31-75 and accompanying text.
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narrowed the scope of these statutes through interpretation and
expansion of employer defenses.214 AFSCME further limited the pro-
tection women have against pay discrimination by increasing a plain-
tiff's proof requirements and the number of defenses to comparable
worth claims.215 These barriers have all but eliminated the viability of
a Title VII comparable worth cause of action. By implicitly rejecting
the comparable worth concept, the Ninth Circuit defeated Congress's
intent that Title VII provide a remedy for all forms of sex discrimina-
tion. Because it incorrectly assumes that the market is nondiscrimi-
natory, AFSCME effectively insulates from attack the more
fundamental and ingrained aspects of wage discrimination.
2 16
To fulfill the broad, remedial purpose of Title VII, courts should
reject the market defense when the employer's use of the market rates
is coupled with the employer's knowledge of the market's discrimina-
tory nature. Use of market rates accompanied by knowledge of the
market's discriminatory nature, or where the employer knows the
true value of jobs, is intentional discrimination within the scope of
Title VII. In this regard, AFSCME is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Gunther to the extent that Gunther was based on the
employer's own evaluation of the job's worth."' So far, courts have
interpreted Gunther so narrowly as to render the decision meaning-
less. In the future, courts should look long and hard before interpret-




214. See supra notes 45-48, 65-75, 81-114 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 100-203 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
* I would like to dedicate this note to my parents. I would also like to thank Charlene
M. Carres for her extremely kind help in the writing of this note.
** I would like to dedicate this article to the people who provide me with motivation,
support, and love: my parents, Earl and Florine Ballman.
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